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Economic Globalization and Civil War

KatherineBarbieri
Universityof South Carolina

Rafael Reuveny
IndianaUniversity
In recent decades, the numberof countrieswith ongoing civil wars and the share of these countries
in the internationalsystem have increased dramatically.At the same time, the scope of economic
globalization has also increased.Are these trendsrelated?The theoreticalliteratureon the determinants of civil wars presents conflicting views about the effects of globalization on such wars. One
view expects economic globalizationto reduce the likelihood of civil wars, ceteris paribus.A second
view expects the opposite.A thirdview implies that globalizationdoes not necessarilyaffect the likelihood of civil war. Progress in assessing the validity of these argumentsrequiresconfrontingthem
with data. However,so far economic globalizationhas been included as a control variablein a very
small numberof studies, and only tradewas inspected.This paper statisticallyinvestigatesthe effect
of several aspects of globalization on civil war from a large-N, time-series, cross-sectional sample.
The occurrenceof civil war is measuredin two ways: the presence of civil war (or civil war prevalence) and the breakdownof civil war (or civil war onset). Economic globalization is measuredby
the flows of trade,foreign direct investment,portfolio investment,and Internetuse. We find that economic forms of globalizationreduce the likelihood of civil war, but that Internetuse does not affect
its likelihood.We conclude the paperwith a discussion of the implicationsof these findingsfor public
policy and for futureresearch.

In recent years, many governmentsand internationalinstitutionshave adopted
policies designed to increasenationalintegrationinto the global economy.People
have reacted with great passion to these policies, at times violently. Whetheror
not one supportsit, most would agree that the scope of economic globalization
has expandedin recent decades. At the same time, the numberof countrieswith
ongoing civil wars andthe proportionof these states in the system have increased.
Are these two developmentsrelated?The civil war literaturepresents competing
theoreticalexpectationsabout the effects of globalization on civil wars. One set
of theories expects globalizationto reduce the likelihood of civil wars.A second
set expects the opposite. A third view implies that globalization should have a
negligible effect on civil wars.
This paper addresses the question of whether states that are more integrated
into the global economy are less likely than others to face civil war. This question has importantpolicy implications, since globalization is expected to conTHEJOURNALOF POLITICS,
Vol.67, No. 4, November2005, Pp. 1228-1247
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tinue and grow. Thus far, alternativeviews about the effect of globalization on
civil war have been subject to almost no large-N empirical investigations.We
seek to contributeto the literatureby investigatinghypotheses on some of the
covariatesof civil war within the context of the debate over globalization.
In our analysis, the unit of analysis is the country-year.The dependentvariable, civil war, is measuredin two ways: its presence and onset. Globalizationis
measuredfrom internationaltrade,foreign direct investment(FDI), foreign portfolio investment(FPI), and Internetuse. These forces are considered along with
other variablesthe literatureidentifies as potentialdeterminantsof civil war.The
analysis includes countrieswith availabledatafor the period 1970-99. Ourresults
reveal that states that are more open to the flow of trade, FDI, and FPI are less
likely to experience civil war. Internetuse, in general, does not affect the likelihood of civil war.
In the next section, we discuss conflicting theories on why and how globalization affects civil war. Next, we present our researchdesign. This is followed
by a discussion of our findings. We conclude by discussing the implications of
our results for policymaking and futureresearch.

Theories of Economic Globalization and Civil War
The effect of economic globalizationon civil warhas recentlybecome a subject
of theoreticaldebate. In one set of theories, globalization promotes peace. In a
second set, it promotescivil war.A thirdview implies that globalizationmay not
affect civil war.

Globalization Reduces the Risk of Civil War
Globalizationis said to reduce the risk of civil war throughseven channels.
PROMOTING
DEVELOPMENT.
Neoclassical economics argues that free markets
promote economic development.Globalizationsimply entails the global spread
of free markets.Openness to trade, FDI, and FPI enables allocation of production factorsto their most efficient uses, promotingdevelopment,which strengthens the government,providing it with more revenues as the tax base is larger.
Richer states, in turn, can have strongerpolice and military,deterringpotential
rebels. Richer countries also can have better infrastructureand administrative
capacity, strengtheningcentral control. In addition, richer people should have
fewer grievances toward governments than poor and should be less likely to
revolt. Lastly, civil wars entail opportunitycosts that should be higher for rich
states (e.g., income that rebels could earn in the labor force, fighting expenses
that could be utilized for growth). Development, therefore, should deter rebellions, thus promotingpeace (Fearonand Laitin 2003; Mason 2003; WorldBank
2002, 2003).
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REDUCING
INCOME
INEQUALITY.
Trade,FDI, and FPI are said to reduce income
in
et
several
inequality
ways (Held al. 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003; WorldBank
2000, 2002). Accordingto neoclassical economics, tradebenefitsownersof abundant factors of productionand harmsowners of scarce factors. Lesser developed
countries(LDCs) are relativelymore endowedwith labor,while developed countries (DCs) are relativelymore endowedwith capital.Thus, tradewill reduce the
earningsof capital and raise the earningsof labor in LDCs, promotingequality.'
Trade also raises productivitysince it promotes competition and since workers
that earn more acquire more education. The competition reduces prices and
diminishes monopolies, benefiting the poor. FDI inflows transfercapital, technology, and managementskills, promotinggrowth and reducing inequality.FPI
inflows allow nations to invest and consume more, promotinggrowth and reducing poverty. Regimes become more efficient to attract investments, because
markets penalize bad economic performance. More efficient public policy
reduces inequalityby improvingtax and welfare systems. Income equality will
promotepeace since it reduces the grievances that incite poor people to rebel.2
REDUCINGSTATECONTROLOVERTHE ECONOMY.States with open economies

are less able to affect domestic economic performance,since they have limited
control over external forces. For example, seeking higher profits, traders may
move their businesses, investors and multinationalcorporations(MNCs) may
leave, and currencytradersmay dump the local currency.Government'sreduced
ability to extractrevenues from business should promote intrastatepeace, since
it makes the state less of a prize for rebels. That is, under globalization the
benefits from taking over the state seem smaller than the costs of a rebellion
(Goodwin 2001; Snyder 1999).
INCREASING
COMMUNICATION
AND INFORMATION
FLOWS. International business

requires communicationand informationflows. Once these channels are open
they also provide informationon domestic politics, increase internationalcontacts, and transmitforeign pressures on governmentsand rebels to resolve conflicts peacefully. Open information and communication channels enable
internationalorganizationsand governmentsto expand their activities overseas,
mediate potential civil wars before they erupt, and resolve existing wars. The
channels should also facilitatethe spreadof democraticnorms respectingpeaceful conflict resolution (Goodwin 2001; Mason 2003. On internationalorganizations, see also Russett and Oneal 2001).
REDUCINGEXPORTOF PRIMARY
PRODUCTS.Dependence on exports of primary

goods is said to promote civil war through several channels discussed shortly.
1The opposite is expected to occur in the DCs, promotinginequality.However,governmentalinstitutions in DCs are generallyable to amelioratethis effect by transferringincome from capital owners
to labor in various ways (e.g., progressivetaxation, employmentbenefits).
2
On the role of inequalityin promotingintrastateconflict, see the next subsection.

Economic Globalizationand Civil War

1231

Economic globalization is expected to promote intrastatepeace since it reduces
this dependence. Trade, FDI, and FPI bring technology and knowledge to a
country,promotingindustrialization.Countriesdependenton exports of primary
goods such as timber,oil, and diamondscan reduce their dependency,diversifying their income sources (The Economist2003; Mason 2003; WorldBank 2003).
INCREASING
THESIZEOF SECURITY
FORCES.Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
limit governmentspendingon protectionism.However,FTAs do not restrictmilitary spending. Governmentssigning FTAs may increase military spending to
createjobs or promote growth.The result is largerand strongersecurity forces.
In addition,economic openness createswinners and losers. The losers may challenge the state to remedy their grievances. Seeking to squash dissent in orderto
promotetradeand attractforeignbusiness, the stateemploysmore securityforces.
This reinforces state power and reduces the risk of civil war (IPN 2003; Martin
and Schumann1998).
GENERATING
ECONOMIC
BENEFITS.
Trade,FDI, and FPI benefit countries,while
conflict is likely to harmthese activities. The potential loss of economic benefits
due to conflict is said to moderatea government'sconflictive responses, promoting internationalpeace (Polachek 1980; Russett and Oneal 2001). Similarly,civil
war should lead to reduced trade and reduced foreign investments. Economic
openness is expected to reduce intrastateviolence, as actors seek to avoid these
losses. A strong state response to rebels, for example, might temporarilystop a
rebellion, but could lead to furtherunrest as the rebels regroup, raising losses
from forfeited internationalbusiness. Thus, states and rebels should have greater
incentive to accommodate each other peacefully and public support for rebels
should be smaller in open, ratherthan closed, economies (Mason 2003; Wager
and Shulz 1995).

Globalization Raises the Risk of Civil War
Globalization is said to raise the likelihood of civil war through several
channels.
PROMOTING
UNDERDEVELOPMENT.
According to dependencytheory, trade and
foreign investmentharmLDCs. The world economy consists of a developed core,
which includes a few countries,and an underdevelopedperiphery,which includes
most other countries. The core is capital intensive. The periphery has a dual
economy, including a small, relatively developed sector controlled by foreign
interests and local elites who export labor-intensivegoods to the core. The rest
of the economy is underdeveloped.The core exports capital-intensivegoods to
the periphery.The core-peripheryterms of tradeharmthe periphery.The periphery's developmentis distorted:industrializationis limited,and the masses remain
poor. The setup is kept in place through explicit or implicit coalitions between
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the elites in the core and the periphery (Amin 1990; dos Santos 1970; Rapley
2002). Distorted developmentpromotes dissent, since the masses in the periphery resent the status quo. The dissent is counteredwith state repression.A cycle
of violence ensues, making rebellion and civil war more likely (Boswell and
Dixon 1990, 1993; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2002). As order deteriorates,
MNCs pressurehost governmentsto defend their investments.If MNCs feel that
the state does not serve their interests,they may hire privatearmies, fund rebels,
or lobby their home state to supportrebels. The resulting social chaos weakens
the state and reduces its perceived legitimacy,raising the likelihood of civil war
(Duffield 2000; Hawley 2000; Reno 2000; Winters 1999).
RAISING
INCOME
Globalizationis said to raise inequalityin several
INEQUALITY.
ways. First, it favors elites at the expense of the masses, as dependency theory
argues. Second,the argumentthat tradereduces inequalityin LDCs assumes that
marketsare free, but rent seeking is prevalentin LDCs, laboris weakerthan land
and capital owners, and wages fall behind (IADB 1998; Rapley 2002; Robbins
1996; Tullock 1980). Third,as LDCs open up to the world economy and begin
to modernize, inequalityrises since wages in more developed sectors are higher
than those in other sectors (Nielson and Alderson 1995). Fourth,MNCs push
local suppliers and governmentsto cut employment benefits and wages. Their
threat to leave weakens labor's bargaining position. MNCs promote a dual
economy and employ capital-intensivetechniquesthatmarginalizeworkers.They
also evade paying local taxes, reducingstate revenuesand,therefore,welfareprograms, which hurtsthe masses more thanthe elites (Bornschierand Chase-Dunn
1985; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Firebaugh1992; Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and
Li 2003). Fifth, to attractforeign investment,states reduce public employment
and privatize,raising unemploymentand inequality.Sixth, financial openness is
prone to crises due to volatile money movementsacross countries. In crises, the
economy contracts,the tax base shrinks,welfare programsdecline or cease, and
many lose their jobs. The poor suffer more than the rich, and inequality rises
(Germain 1997; Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003; Strange 1996; UNDP
1999).
The link from inequalityto civil war begins with a sense of deprivationwhen
economic conditions differ from expectations. Deprived people feel that some
groups succeed since they are favoredunfairlyby the government.The grievance
provides fertile recruitinggrounds for rebels who depict the regime as promoting the interests of some groups at the expense of others (Boswell and Dixon
1990; Mason 2003; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Selbin 2001).
REDUCING
STATECONTROL
OFTHEECONOMY.State control of an open economy

is harderthan control of a closed economy. Foreign interestsmay overridelocal
needs. Investorsmay move money in and out of the country.Commodityprices
may fluctuatein world markets.Facingthese forces, the state is less able to compensate the losers from openness. Disputes over who should bear the costs of

Economic Globalizationand Civil War

1233

adjustmentmay lead to calls for a retrenchmentto liberalization.Sensing state
weakness, the opposition may protest, strike, riot, and even rebel (Adams, Dev
Gupta,and Mengisteab 1999; Hoogvelt 2001; IPN 2003; Martinand Schumann
1998). Growingeconomic openness also typically involves deregulationof electronic commerceand communications,which eases the ability of rebels and arms
dealersto evade statecontrol.Deregulationof transportationsectors, flags of convenience, and offshore registrationof companies make it harder for states to
monitor freight traffic. Rebels are thus better able to acquire external supplies
needed to wage war against the state (Berdal 2003; Duffield 2000; SAS 2001;
Wood and Peleman 1999).
FLOWS. The globalizationINCREASINGCOMMUNICATION
AND INFORMATION

inducedexpansionof communicationand informationnetworksfacilitatesrebels'
organizationalactivities. The media helps spreadthe rebels' cause, which assists
in recruitment,fund raising, and mobilizationof the masses. Cross borderinformation flows raise expectationsabout ethnic sovereigntythroughdemonstration.
Electronic networks help finance rebels' activities, including acquiring arms.
Market deregulation also may ease the creation of business alliances among
rebels, warlords, foreign mercenaries, organized crime syndicates, and arms
dealers. All of these activities assist the rebellion, increasing the likelihood of
civil war (Berdal2003; de Zeeuw and Frerks2000; Mason 2003; United Nations
2001).
PROMOTING
EXPORTOF PRIMARY
PRODUCTS.International markets force LDCs

to focus on theircomparativeadvantagein producingprimarygoods, which raises
the likelihood of civil war due to several forces. Leaders may amass personal
wealth by siphoning off export earnings and ignoring society's needs. Corrupt
leaders may share profits with supportbases, angering other groups. Moreover,
when primaryproductsare found in a region dominatedby one ethnic group,that
groupmay wish to secede from the home country.The state is likely to reactwith
force. Controllingprimarygoods also can provide rebels with funds to finance
their activities. When the production and transportof primary resources are
complex (e.g., oil), rebels can extort money from firms throughkidnappingsand
threatsto damage economic installations,unless ransomsare paid (Berdal 2003;
The Economist 2003; Wood 2003; WorldBank 2003).
STIMULATING
BETWEENREBELSANDORGANIZED
CRIME.Rebellions
ALLIANCES

typically begin with a political goal. Over time, some rebellions acquire attributes of criminalventures, appropriatingresources and wealth. As intrastateviolence centered on appropriationrises, the state becomes more oppressive.
Globalizationweakens state legitimacy,as it cannot shield people from external
economic shocks. The combinationof a weaker state and strongerrebel-organized crime alliances raises the risk of attemptsto take over the state (Duffield
2000; The Economist 2003; FBI 2004; Kaldor and Luckham2001).
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GENERATING
UNEQUAL
ECONOMIC
BENEFITS.One argument in the previous sub-

section was that the fear of forfeitingthe economic benefits of globalizationprevents civil war.This logic assumes implicitly that all groups benefit equally from
economic openness and are, therefore, similarly motivatedto refrain from violence. In internationalrelations, some studies reason that since two states do not
necessarilyequally sharethe gains from economic interaction,globalizationmay
not promotepeace, and may even promoteconflict (see Barbieri2002 for review).
Similarly, the gains and losses from globalization are distributed unequally
among domestic actors. While neoclassical economics envisions the benefits of
openness outweighing its costs, stylized observationssuggest that winners typically do not compensatethe losers unless compelled to do so by the government.
When compensation is imperfect, the gap between winners and losers widens.
Consequently,it is possible to argue that the fear of economic losses may not
deter the losers of globalization.

Globalization Does Not Affect the Likelihood of Civil War
The argumentthat globalizationhas no effect on civil war is not explicit in the
literature,but ratherfollows from studies arguingthat economic globalizationis
not an importantforce for most countries.These argumentscan be categorized
into three groups. One group argues that the alleged extent of globalization is
exaggerated,particularlyfor LDCs. A second group disputes the claim that the
state is powerless relativeto foreign economic forces or is unable to compensate
losers. A third group argues that the effects of globalization vary across countries, depending upon the identity of losers and winners, and the nature of the
local institutions.3

Implications and Previous Empirical Treatments
It is clear that the literaturehas conflicting expectations about the effect of
globalization on civil war. All the views discussed above present face validity.
Based on theoreticalargumentsalone, it is not possible to decide which of these
sets of theories is most accurate.The expectations,therefore,need to be evaluated empirically.As it happens, the issue has not received much empirical-statistical attentionso far.When the role of economic openness in civil war has been
examined empirically,it has been treated as one of many control variables.To
our knowledge, only two studies estimate the effect of globalizationon civil war
and they focus only on trade.Esty et al. (1998) reportthat tradereducesthe likelihood of civil war onset, while Fearonand Laitin (2003) reportthat trade does
not affect civil war onset. Clearly,there is room for additionalempirical analysis of the effect of globalizationon civil war.

3For group 1, see Hirst (1997), group 2, see Garrett(1998), group 3, see Longworth(1998).
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Research Design
In designing our statisticalanalysis,we considerseveralissues. First,what constitutesa civil war?We use the list of wars compiled by Fearonand Laitin (2003)
in theirwell-receivedstudy.It includesall the intrastateconflicts duringthe period
1945-99 that meet four criteria:(1) the conflict involved fightingbetween a state
and a nonstate group who seeks to take control in a region, seeks to topple the
government,or use violence in orderto achieve some goal; (2) the conflict killed
at least 1,000 people overall, from either side; (3) the conflict killed at least 100
people per year on average, from either side; and (4) the conflict killed at least
100 people on each side of the fight.
Second,two variablesare employedin the literatureto measurecivil war.Many
studies focus on the onset of civil war, which is set to 1 in the first year of a war
and 0 otherwise (e.g., Esty et al. 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Other studies
focus on the presence (also termed prevalenceor incidence) of civil war, which
is set to 1 during each year of a war and 0 otherwise (e.g., Elbadawiand Sambanis 2002; Reynal-Querol2002). In our context, focusing on the onset of civil
war suggests an implied assumptionthat globalization only enters actors' decisions about startingcivil wars. Examiningthe presence of civil war suggests that
actors consider the role of globalization in each year of the war. Both the presence and onset of civil war are importantmeasures,and each will be considered
here.
Third,as a multidimensionalconcept, we need to measure economic globalization with several indicators.At the state level, economic globalizationimplies
openness to the world economy and its associated communicationand information flows. We will employ indicatorsof trade,FDI, FPI, and Internetuse. While
other forms of communicationand informationflows seem relevant,they are not
used here, as will be discussed shortly.
Fourth,since all nations are affected by economic globalization, we include
all states for which data are available. The unit of analysis is the state-year.
The number of states per year varies over time due to missing data and
changes in the internationalsystem, ranging from 121 to 156. This variation
is typical of large-N, pooled designs. The sample covers the period 1970-99;
the start date was dictated by the availability of globalization data, while the
end date coincided with the end of the civil war data. The pooled design
enables assessment of the effect of globalizationon civil war across nations and
over time.
Fifth, in our 1970-99 period,almost all civil wars occurredin the LDCs, which
also tend to be less globalized than the DCs. While globalization'sinfluence on
civil war may not be relatedto development,there may be differentialeffects of
globalizationin LDCs thanin otherstates.To assess this possibility,we firstinvestigate the effects of globalization for all countriesand then focus exclusively on
the LDCs, as measured by nonmembershipin the Organizationfor Economic
Development and Cooperation(OECD).
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Sixth, controlvariablesneed to be addedto ensurethat our results are not spurious. Recently, civil war scholars have used several common control variables,
which we also employ here, including income per capita,population,democracy,
political stability, ethno-religious structures,and naturalresource exports (see,
e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). To these, we add
geographicalattributesand temporaldependencevariables.
Seventh, civil war and some of our right hand side variablesmay affect each
other. For example, democracy may affect civil war, but civil war may also be
affected by conflict, an argumentthat goes back to Tocqueville.Tradeand investment may affect civil war, but war may also affect trade and investment. Some
firmswill avoid states with civil strife, while othersmay seek to meet the demand
of warring parties (e.g., Barbieri and Levy 1999; Pollins 1989). Similar arguments applyto per capitaincome and population.While one cannotmodel all the
possible interactions,one should not ignore the risk posed by simultaneitybias.
One way to addressthis issue is by lagging the right-hand-sidevariables(e.g., Li
and Reuveny 2003; Muller and Seligson 1994; Oneal and Russett 1999). While
this is an imperfect solution, we adopt it.
Eighth, we study some of the covariatesof civil war in the context of the globalization discourse. We have discussed two sets of theories. One set argues that
globalizationraises the risk of civil war; a second set arguesthe opposite. Given
their assumptions,we cannot reject these sets of theories on theoreticalgrounds.
Each of these sets expects a certain sign for the effect of globalization on civil
war.We test each sign againstthe null hypothesisthat globalizationhas no effect
on civil war, by employing a one-tail test in reportingthe results (for studies
taking a similarapproachsee, e.g., Morrow,Siverson,andTabares(1998), Li and
Reuveny (2003), Oneal and Russett (1999), and Reuveny and Li (2003)).
Finally, pooled designs such as ours may exhibit temporal dependence from
the predominanceof peace. Ignoringthis issue can lead to a missing variablebias
and serial correlation.Withserial correlation,estimatedcoefficients are unbiased,
but their standarderrorsare biased. We employ Beck, Katz, and Tucker's(1998)
method to model the temporaldependence.4We also confrontthe possibilities of
heteroskedasticityand serial correlation(whetheror not temporaldependenceis
present). With heteroskedasticity,the estimated coefficients also are not biased,
but their standarderrors are. We deal with these risks by using White's (1980)
estimator,to which we add the option of clustering over countries, generating
consistent and robust standarderrorsunder general conditions of serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity(Wiggins 1999).
The dependentvariable, civil war, is measured in two ways. Waris coded 1
when a country has a civil war in a given year and 0 otherwise. Onset is coded
1 the year a civil war begins and 0 otherwise. Data for both variablescome from
Fearonand Laitin (2003). Their sample includes 127 civil wars duringthe period
1945-99, while ours includes 74 wars duringthe period 1970-99.
4

The technique employs a counterof years of peace and three cubic spline terms.
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Globalizationis measuredfrom the yearly levels of trade,FDI, FPI, and Internet use. The data for all these variablescome from the WorldBank (2004). Trade
is equal to the sum of a state'stotal importsplus exports, divided by its GDP,per
year. FDI involve two activities of firms in countries other than their own: creation of subsidiariesandpurchasingof at least 10%of the voting stocks of foreign
firms (giving the buyer managementpower). It is given by the sum of the net
inflow of FDI into a country(inflow minus outflow) dividedby GDP.FPI denotes
the ratio between the net inflow of portfolio investment(inflow minus outflow)
and GDP.It measuresprivatetransactionsin stocks and bonds. Internetmeasures
the number of Internetusers per 1000 people in a country.These data are not
availablepriorto 1990. We believe it is safe to assume that Internetuse was virtually zero priorto 1990.5While it would be useful to include measuresof other
forms of communicationand informationflows, measures of radio, television,
phone, and newspaperuse are all highly correlatedwith GDP per capita, another
variable employed, and with each other (r < .85). Internet does not pose this
problem of collinearity.To the extent that GDP per capita serves as a proxy for
these other variables,their effect on civil war can be said to be included in the
model.6
The data for the control variables,other than the temporaldependencemeasures, come from Fearonand Laitin (2003). Beginning with GDP Per Capita, it
is generallyexpected thatincreasesin this variablewill reducethe grievancesthat
make civil war more likely. Richer states are also able to allocate more resources
to security,which reduces the risk of attackby rebels. Oil State is coded as 1 if
a country's fuel exports are greater than one third of its total export, and zero
otherwise.Vast oil reserves may create grievances over the distributionof benefits, financialincentives for rebels to gain power,targetsfor extortion,and funds
to finance war, all of which should increase the likelihood of civil war.
Mountainousindicates the share of national areas that are mountainous.The
assumptionis that difficult terrainsprovide an advantageto rebels over government forces, raising the likelihood of civil war.NoncontiguousTerritoryis coded
as 1 when nationalterritorieswith at least 10,000 people are geographicallyseparated from the capital city and 0 otherwise. Noncontiguous territories are
thoughtto aid rebel efforts, since they make it more difficult for governmentsto
service and monitorpeople, raising the likelihood of civil war.
Democracy measures the difference between the democratic and autocratic
attributesof a state, reportedin the Polity IV data set. On the one hand, democratic states are believed to be more responsiveto the people's demandsand less
5 See Interet
Society at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history.
Beginning in 1990, thereare no states
with missing data once they begin reportingInternetuse, except Haiti in 1997. We code this point as
missing. Using values from 1996, 1998, and their average did not change our result.
6 Internetuse may not be an ideal measure of the
ability of internationalorganizationsand other
states to manage internal conflicts within another country. That said, the Internet has become a
medium of communicationand data transferfor some organizationsand governments,as well as a
source of informationon other countries,which can enhance conflict resolution activities.
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likely to experience civil war. On the other hand, freedom creates opportunities
of association and movement that would make rebellion easier. Some believe
there is a curvilinearrelationship(or an invertedU shape) between democracy
and civil war. Political Instability is coded as 1 if the Polity IV regime scores
changes at least three points duringa three-yearperiod, and 0 otherwise. Unstable states may appearweak and become the targetof attack,increasingthe likelihood of civil war.
Populationdenotes the logged populationsize, per year. It is generally argued
that it is more difficult to govern and meet the demands of large populations,
which raises the risk of civil war. Ethnic Fractionalizationmeasures national
ethnic homogeneity.It is an index thatgives the likelihoodof two randomlydrawn
people in a country belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups. Religious
Fractionalization is analogous to the measure of ethnic homogeneity, but it
focuses on the degree of religious homogeneityin a country.Both these variables
are generally expected to raise the likelihood of civil war.7
Finally,Peace Yearscounts the numberof years since the last civil war and is
set to 0 duringwar.We also include three cubic spline variables.These controls
for temporaldependenceare generatedby a programcreatedby Tucker(1999).

EmpiricalResults
Table 1 presentsresults for civil war presence and Table2 for civil war onset.
In each Table, we first present the results for all the countries, and then for the
LDCs. This is followed by a summaryof related analyses reportedin Appendix
A.8

In Table 1, Models 1-3 reportthe results for all the countries,and Models 4-5
report the results for the LDCs. Model 1 includes all the variables described
above, while Model 2 adds another variable related to temporal dependence.
Model 3 excludes statistically insignificantvariables.Model 4 applies Model 2
to the LDCs, and Model 5 excludes the insignificantvariablesfor LDCs. Across
models, the results for the control variablesgenerally agree with those reported
by Fearon and Laitin (2003), which mirrors those reported in other studies.
Hence, our primaryinvestigationrests on a robust statisticalplatform.
In Model 1, the effects of Trade,FDI and FPI on civil war presence (War)are
negative and statisticallysignificant.Hence, trade, FDI and FPI reduce the likelihood of war. Recalling the definitionsof these variables,our results imply that
as Trade,FDI and FPI become more economically importantto a country,the
likelihood of civil war presence falls. Internethas no significanteffect on War.9
7We did not include Fearonand Laitin's "new state" variable, because there were no new states
with complete data that experiencedcivil wars, making it a perfect predictorof peace.
8The
Appendix is availableon the Journal of Politics website http://www.journalofpolitics.org/.
9One might assume thatthis results from Internet'shigh correlationwith GDP Per Capita, but that
is not the case (r = .36). Rather,it reflects the lack of variationin Internetpriorto 1990. Our results
do not change when we remove Internetfrom the model.
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TABLE 1

Globalization and Civil War Presence
Model 1
Variables
Tradetl
FDI,
FPI,I
Interett,
GDP per capitatl
Population,tl
Mountainous,tl
NoncontiguousTerritory,l
Oil Statet,,
Political Instability
Democracyt,,
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization

Constant
N
Log pseudo-likelihood

Model 3

-.013**
(.008)
-.063*
(.048)
-.170***
(.047)
.003
(.004)
-.227***
(.078)
.179**
(.110)
.041
(.098)
1.450***
(.438)
.135
(.421)
-.798*
(.531)
.016
(.041)
-.220
(.459)
.176
(.647)

-2.104***
(.248)
1.852*
(1.392)
2,361
-232.93

-.012*
(.008)
-.075**
(.047)
-.164***
(.046)
-.000
(.005)
-.227***
(.077)
.170*
(.109)
.047
(.100)
1.243***
(.462)
.178
(.404)
-.722*
(.535)
.013
(.041)
-.404
(.481)
.034
(.636)
.053**
(.027)
-1.887***
(.275)
1.549
(1.424)
2,361
-230.51

Model 4

Model 5

Developing States

All States

WarCount
Peace Years

Model 2

-.013**
(.008)
-.067*
(.047)
-.162***
(.043)

-.222***
(.066)
.186**
(.106)

1.413***
(.413)

-.687*
(.525)

.045**
(.026)
-1.892***
(.283)
1.407
(1.334)
2,364
-232.86

-.011*
(.008)
-.078**
(.045)
-.163***
(.057)
-.179*
(.131)
-.386***
(.121)
.168*
(.113)
.145*
(.096)
1.181***
(.541)
.352
(.381)
-.681*
(.515)
.026
(.041)
-.296
(.422)
-.491
(.696)
.039**
(.024)
-1.828***
(.260)
1.732*
(1.474)
1,892
-221.66

-.012*
(.008)
-.070*
(.047)
-.156***
(.054)
-.158*
(.116)
-.331***
(.112)
.180**
(.103)
.125*
(.097)
1.348***
(.466)

-.637*
(.507)

.033*
(.023)
-1.840***
(.269)
1.274
(1.392)
1,895
-224.42

Notes: White robust standarderrorsadjustedfor clusteringover country appearin parentheses.
*** significantat 1 percent, ** significantat 5 percent, * significantat 10 percent.
The cubic spline variablesare included in the analyses, but not reportedhere.

Turningto the control variables,the effect of GDP Per Capita is significant
and negative, suggesting that we are less likely to see civil war in rich countries
thanin poor ones. We are also more likely to witness civil war in stateswith large,
ratherthan small, populations,as given by the statistically significant and positive coefficient for Population.
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Mountainousis found to be unrelatedto War,while NoncontiguousTerritory
has a statisticallysignificantand positive effect on civil war. Hence, having sections of the populations separatedfrom central control raises the likelihood of
civil war. Oil State lacks statistical significance, meaning that oil exporters are
no more or less likely than others to experience a civil war.
The effect of Political Instabilityon Waris negative and significant.While this
resultmay appearcounterintuitive,recall thatthis variableindicatesthatthe Polity
regime score has changed in recent years. That change may mean the state has
become more or less democratic;it may also mean the governmenthas more or
less support.Ourfindingimplies thatpost-changestates may be bettersupported,
better able to fend off attacks,or better able to satisfy people and preventgrievances that produce civil wars. The effects of Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Religious Fractionalizationon civil war are not statisticallysignificant,
which mirrorsthe findings of others.
The coefficients of Peace Years and the three cubic spline variables (not
reportedhere) are all statisticallysignificant,indicatingthattemporaldependence
is present in our sample. The negative coefficient for Peace Yearstells us that
states that enjoy a history of peace are less likely to experience civil war.
The Peace Yearscounter treats all civil war years as equal. In other words, a
one-year war is treatedthe same as a 30-year war; both receive zeros for Peace
Years.However,we may need to differentiateshort and long periods of war,just
as we differentiateshort and long periods of peace. WarCountin Model 2 counts
the numberof years that civil war has lasted,beginning with a 1 in the year after
the war outbreak.It is reset to zero once peace has lasted for more thanone year.10
We find that WarCounthas a statisticallysignificantand positive effect on War.
The longerthe civil war,the more likely a stateis to experiencea civil war.Including this variabledoes not change any of our results. Hence, WarCountshould be
included in the model. Model 3 excludes statisticallyinsignificantcontrol variables from Model 2. Our results are unaltered.
Models 4 and 5 focus on the LDCs. The effects of the controlvariablesin this
case are similar to those obtained for all the countries, except that the effect of
Mountainous,which is positive before, is now statisticallysignificant.The effects
of Trade,FDI and FPI in Models 4 and 5 are virtuallythe same as those obtained
for all countries.The effect of Internetuse also is negative and statisticallysignificant.Hence, economic openness and informationflows reduce the likelihood
of civil war presence for the LDCs.
Table 2 focuses on civil war Onset. Model 1 employs the same variables as
Model 1 in Table 1. Model 2 excludes the insignificantvariables.Models 3 and
4 focus on the LDCs."
Beginningwith the controlvariables,our findingsin Table2 are consistentwith
the results obtainedby Fearonand Laitin (2003). The effects of GDP Per Capita,
0The war dates from Fearonand Laitin (2003) are used to constructthis variable.
n Model 1 in Table 1 is used and not Model since WarCount is not relevantto onset.
2,
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Globalization and Civil War Onset
Model 1
Variables
Trade,,
FDIt_
FPI,1
Internet,_
GDP per capita,_
Population1l
Mountainous,_l
NoncontiguousTerritory,_
Oil State,,
Political Instability
Democracyt_l
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Peace Years
Constant
N
Log pseudo-likelihood

Model 2

All States
-.003
(.008)
-.069*
(.055)
-.042
(.080)
-.001
(.054)
-.396***
(.162)
.187**
(.110)
.252**
(.121)
.330
(.521)
.829**
(.417)
.440
(.385)
.021
(.036)
-.138
(.697)
.361
(.909)
.091
(.188)
-6.138***
(1.521)
2,361
-157.89

Model 3

Model 4

Developing States

-.003
(.007)
-.059
(.054)
-.049
(.073)
-.010
(.064)
-.371***
(.117)
.200**
(.094)
.244**
(.113)

.791**
(.387)

-5.598***
(1.276)
2,361
-159.89

-.003
(.008)
-.069
(.056)
-.044
(.073)
-.004
(.068)
-.333**
(.198)
.181**
(.110)
.248**
(.120)
.370
(.530)
.763**
(.419)
.447
(.383)
.019
(.036)
-.118
(.706)
.470
(.918)
.090
(.186)
-6.207***
(1.531)
1,892
-157.45

-.003
(.007)
-.059
(.055)
-.050
(.068)
-.012
(.074)
-.328***
(.144)
.198**
(.094)
.252**
(.121)

.739**
(.391)

-5.616***
(1.287)
1,892
-159.57

Notes: White robust standarderrorsadjustedfor clustering over country appearin parentheses.
*** significantat 1 percent, ** significantat 5 percent, * significantat 10 percent.
The cubic spline variablesare included in the analyses, but not reportedhere.

Population, Mountainous, Oil State are significant and have the same signs as
found in their study.The variablesthey deem insignificant-Noncontiguous Territory, Democracy, Peace Years,the splines, and Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization-are also insignificanthere. The effect of Instability is positive, as in
Fearon and Laitin's model, but is not significant, which is probablydue to our
smaller sample.
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With the control variablesbehaving as expected,we turnto globalization.The
results in Table2 differ from those in Table 1. Globalizationhas negligible effects
on the onset of civil war.As Fearonand Laitin (2003) find, Tradedoes not affect
the likelihood of civil war Onset. Other aspects of globalization also have no
effect. The exception is found for FDI, which has a significantnegative effect in
Model 1. Yet,that effect disappearsunderfurtherscrutiny.Models 3 and 4 reveal
that globalizationdoes affect the likelihood of civil war Onset.
The finding that globalization reduces the risk of civil war presence but does
not affect the likelihood of civil war onset is intuitivelyappealing.The outbreak
of civil war often reflects an intense state of emotions, anger, and a deep conviction that goals can only be achieved through force. The opposing side is
equally resolved to respond in kind. In this atmosphere,actors may fail to allocate sufficientweight to the consequence of war, including economic losses. As
the war continues,however,business will be disrupted,foreign investorswill flee,
and trade will decline. Losses will mount on both sides. As Oneal and Russett
(2003) remindus recently,most theories of war assume that actors are rational.
This means that actors continue to evaluate their decisions to wage war as new
informationbecomes available. Our results are consistent with the notion that
people will find civil war less desirablewhen faced with mountinglosses due to
the adverse effects of civil war on a country'sties to the world economy.
How large is the effect of globalization in reducingthe risk of civil war presence? To answerthis question,we estimate how much the probabilitythat a state
will experiencecivil warwould change if it moved fromthe averagelevel of some
attributeof globalization to one standarddeviation above average, holding all
othervariablesat their mean values. We find that states with high Tradeare about
28% less likely to experience Warthanthose with averageTrade;LDCs with high
Tradeare 29% less likely. States with high FDI are 14%less likely to experience
Warthan those with averageFDI (17% for LDC). High FPI reduces the likelihood of Warby 29% (27% for LDCs) comparedto the averagelevel of FPI. For
LDCs with high Internet, the likelihood of Waris 52% less than with average
Internet.2
Finally, we summarize related analyses discussed in Appendix A. First, we
examine if the globalizationresults hold when a curvilinearrelationshipbetween
Democracy and Waris included in the model. We find that the results in Table 1
still hold. Second, we examine if changes in globalization, ratherthan levels,
affect War.We find no significanteffect from changes in Tradeor FDI. Positive
changes in FPI reduce the likelihood of Warfor both samples. Positive changes
in Internetreduce the likelihood of Waronly for the LDCs. Third,we combine
the curvilineardemocracymeasureand the changes in globalization.We find no
difference in results for the changes in globalization relative to the previous
resultsas well as no significantcurvilineardemocracyeffects. Fourth,we exclude
12We use Models 2 and 4 in Table 1 to
performthese estimates (see Tomz, Wittenberg,and King
2003).
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Peace Yearsand the splines from Models 2 and 4 in Table 1. Our findings for
globalizationdo not change relativeto Table 1, except that the negative effect of
Internetis now significant.

Conclusion
The literaturehas presentedconflictingtheoreticalviews on the effect of globalization on civil war. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first
attemptto assess statistically the debate from a large N sample. Globalization
was measuredfrom Trade,FDI, FPI, and Internetuse. Civil war was measured
as presence and onset. The analysis was conducted for all countries with available data, and for the LDCs alone. We covered the period 1970-99.
The results show that trade, FDI, and FPI reduce the likelihood of civil war
presence for all states. Internetuse reduces the likelihood of civil war presence
only for the LDCs. Globalizationdoes not affect the likelihood of civil war onset.
These findings are found to be robustacross differentsensitivity analyses.Taken
as a whole, our results suggest that actors initiating civil war do not consider
globalization. However, they reassess their decisions about the civil war over
time, as the losses that come with lost global ties mount.
Our results have importantpolicy implications. In recent decades, nearly all
civil wars have taken place in the LDCs. These countriestend to be less open to
the world economy.We find that economic openness reduces the likelihood that
civil war will be presentin LDCs, but not the likelihood of its onset. Policies that
raise per capita income, reduce population size, and reduce dependence on oil
exportsare likely to be the most effective strategiesto reducethe risk of civil war
outbreak.Economic openness is neverthelessrecommendedsince it reduces the
likelihood of ongoing civil war.
Thatsaid, efforts to integrateLDCs into the global economy must be done cautiously. All the argumentsabout the possible consequences of globalization for
civil war have merits.While the pacifying forces of globalizationare more apparent in our large N sample, it is still possible that globalizationwill worsen civil
strife in individualcases, making civil war more likely.
Ourpaper,like all studies, must be viewed as the startof a journey,not its end.
Futureresearchmay extend this analysis. For example, it would be beneficial to
expandthe historicaldomainof the study.Ourpreliminaryresearchsuggests that
this would be a difficultprojectinvolving a large data collection effort from individual country sources.
Futureresearchalso may explore the reciprocalrelationshipbetween civil war
and some of its determinants.So far, this issue has generally been handled by
lagging the right hand side variables,as was done here. Estimatingthe reciprocal relationshipwithin our context is likely to be difficult. The simultaneityof
globalization and civil war involves at least four continuous variables and one
dichotomousvariable.To our best knowledge, the estimationalgorithmsrequired
for this analysis are not yet available. Madalla's(1983) method comes closest,
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but his solution only works for models involving one dichotomous variableand
one continuousvariable.
Finally, future research may study microlevel processes within the state to
understandthe linkages between globalization and civil war. For example, we
might imagine that globalizationcreatesor diffuses tensions over the distribution
of benefits within society. This paper has employed a nation-yearlevel of analysis, which is the norm in the statistical civil war literature.New insights might
be gained from going deeper into the nationalbox.
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